This paper develops methods for assessing the sensitivity of capital ‡ows to global …nancial conditions, and applies the methods in assessing the impact of macroprudential policies introduced by Korea in 2010. Relative to a comparison group of countries, we …nd that the sensitivity of capital ‡ows into Korea to global conditions decreased in the period following the introduction of macroprudential policies.
Introduction
Beginning in June 2010, Korea introduced a series of macroprudential measures aimed at building resilience against external …nancial shocks, especially against its well-known vulnerability to capital ‡ow reversals in the banking sector and the associated disruptions to domestic …nan-cial conditions. Korea was one of the countries hardest hit in the 1997 Asian …nancial crisis, and was again at the sharp end of the …nancial turmoil unleashed after the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In recognition of the sources of Korea's vulnerabilities (on which more below), the macroprudential measures introduced from 2010 were aimed at moderating the procyclicality of the banking sector by dampening the ‡uctuations in the growth of so-called "non-core"bank liabilities, especially cross-border banking sector liabilities.
The purpose of our paper is to give a preliminary empirical assessment of the impact of the measures introduced by the Korean authorities, and to revisit the rationale behind their design so as to re…ne the thinking behind capital ‡ows and …nancial stability. In this respect, the case of Korea represents a natural experiment for investigating the impact of new macroprudential policies. Our assessment is based on the framework developed in our earlier paper on global liquidity (Bruno and Shin (2011) ) where global …nancial conditions drive banking sector capital ‡ows through the funding and lending operations of international banks. Our empirical proxies for global …nancial conditions draw on the institutional structure of cross-border banking and the status of the US dollar as the currency that underpins the global banking system, as explained below.
Our assessment of the performance of Korea's macroprudential tools is based on a panel study where Korea is one of 48 countries in a sample that encompasses both advanced and emerging economies. Our approach is to treat the countries other than Korea as a comparison group and ask, …rst, how Korea's susceptibility to the global factors in capital ‡ows compares to the other countries during the entire sample period. Then, having obtained a benchmark for comparison from this cross-country panel study, we ask whether the empirical relationship between Korea and the comparison group changed in any noticeable way following the sequenced introduction of macroprudential measures in Korea from June 2010. We exploit the panel structure by reviewing the evidence both across time and in the cross-section, as well as examining the full complement of interaction dummies to test for structural changes.
To anticipate our main conclusion, we do indeed …nd evidence that capital ‡ows into Korea became less sensitive to global factors after the introduction of its macroprudential measures.
Interestingly, this change in Korea's sensitivity to global conditions is in contrast to the other countries in the region. We …nd that Korea's experience is the opposite of other comparable countries in Asia, whose sensitivity to global liquidity conditions actually increased after June 2010. Speci…cally, when we examine the same set of regressions applied one by one to the "Big Five" ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) as well as to Australia, we …nd that their incremental sensitivity to global liquidity conditions was higher after June 2010. Thus, Korea's lower sensitivity to global liquidity conditions after June 2010 stands out in contrast.
More broadly, we see the contribution of our paper as o¤ering a simple but useful methodology for examining the impact of macroprudential policies by identifying variables that are known proxies for global liquidity, and then investigating how the sensitivity of a particular aggregate to global conditions varies over time, before and after the introduction of the new policies.
Although our empirical methodology cannot fully control for other events in the capitalrecipient economy that occur at the same time as the introduction of the new policy regime, the use of country …xed e¤ects and country-level control variables account for country-speci…c shocks. Our method is a useful …rst step when searching for instances that deserve more careful scrutiny through micro empirical investigations.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We begin by describing the background to our study by outlining the rationale for why the "non-core" liabilities of the banking sector are a good proxy for the underlying …nancial conditions and the vulnerability to a reversal. We further explain how, in the context of cross-border banking, capital ‡ows through the banking sector are closely related to the ‡uctuations in non-core liabilities. We then describe the institutional background for Korea and outline the timing and sequencing of the macroprudential measures introduced in Korea. The core empirical investigation of the paper then follows in two sections.
We conclude by drawing implications for the relationship between capital ‡ows and …nancial stability.
Background 2.1 Global Banking System
Banking activity is a key driver of …nancial conditions both within and across borders. Rapid growth of bank lending is mirrored on the liabilities side of the balance sheet by shifts in the composition of bank funding. As banks are intermediaries who borrow in order to lend, they must seek funding in order to lend to their borrowers. In an economy with domestic savers, the primary source of funding available to the bank is the retail deposits of the household sector -the "core" funding. During a credit boom, however, the bank resorts to alternative, noncore liabilities to …nance its lending when its access to core deposit funding does not keep pace with the growth of its lending.
1 Cross-border bank …nancing where banks draw on wholesale funding supplied by the global banks is likely to be an important component of non-core funding when the …nancial system has an open banking sector as in Korea. Given the close connection between procyclicality and capital ‡ows, there are close parallels between currency crises and credit crises in countries that operate with open banking sectors. Hahm, Shin and Shin (2011) …nd in their panel probit study of …nancial crisis indicators that the ratio of non-core to core funding (especially the non-core liabilities to foreign creditors) is the most consistently reliable indicator of vulnerability of a country, both to a currency crisis and to a credit crisis.
Elsewhere (Bruno and Shin (2011) ), we have explored the role of global "supply push"factors as key determinants of cross-border bank capital ‡ows. In particular, variables that determine the risk-taking behavior of global banks through their leverage decision turn out to be useful in explaining the "supply push" forces in cross-border capital ‡ows. Here, we build on these earlier …ndings by examining how macroprudential policies may mitigate such global supply 1 The distinction between core and non-core funding is discussed in more detail in . push forces by moderating the procyclicality of the banking sector.
Regional Bank

Global Bank
As a background to our study, we reiterate brie ‡y the institutional backdrop that motivates our approach to cross-border banking as well as provide some additional institutional background for Korea.
2 Our empirical investigation rests on the interaction between local and global banks depicted in Figure 1 . The direction of …nancial ‡ows goes from right to left, to stick to the convention of having assets on the left hand side of the balance sheet and liabilities on the right hand side. In stage 1 in Figure 1 , global banks raise wholesale funding and supply wholesale funding to local banks in other jurisdictions. The local banks draw on the cross-border funding (stage 2) in order to lend to their local borrowers (stage 3). Stage 1 corresponds to the activity of global banks borrowing in …nancial centers.
A BIS (2010) study describes how the branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the United
States borrow from money market funds and then channel the funds to their headquarters. Baba, McCauley and Ramaswamy (2009 ), McGuire and von Peter (2009 ), IMF (2011 ) and Shin (2012b note that in the run-up to the crisis, roughly 50% of the assets of U.S. prime money market funds were obligations of European banks. The funds channeled by the branch to headquarters (intero¢ ce assets) constitute gross capital out ‡ows from the United States. Readers interested in further details may consult Bruno and Shin (2011) and for the background on the global banking system and for Korea's experience, respectively. Billion dollars
Net interoffice assets of foreign banks in US Figure 2 . The left hand chart shows the assets and liabilities of foreign bank branches and subsidiaries ("foreignrelated institutions") in the US on their parent. The right hand chart shows the net intero¢ ce assets of foreign banks in the US, given by the negative of the "net due to foreign-related o¢ ces". (Source: Federal Reserve H8 series)
branch or subsidiary of the foreign bank on its parent. Normally, net intero¢ ce assets would be negative, as foreign bank branches act as lending outposts. However, we see that the decade between 2001 to 2011 was exceptional, when net intero¢ ce assets turned sharply positive, before reversing into negative territory during the height of the European crisis in 2011. In e¤ect, during the decade between 2001 and 2011, foreign bank o¢ ces became funding sources for the parent, rather than lending outposts. As noted by the BIS (2010) report, many European banks use a centralized funding model in which available funds are deployed globally through a centralized portfolio allocation decision. Goldberg (2009, 2010 ) provide extensive evidence using bank level data that internal capital markets serve to reallocate funding within global banking organizations.
The net intero¢ ce position of foreign banks in the US therefore re ‡ects the extent to which global banks were engaged in supplying US dollar funding to other parts of the world. In our empirical investigation below, we will use the growth of the net intero¢ ce account position of foreign banks in the US as a key empirical proxy for the availability of wholesale funding provided to borrowers in the capital-recipient economy -a key "supply push"factor. Q4 1979-Q2 1980-Q4 1982-Q2 1983-Q4 1985-Q2 1986-Q4 1988-Q2 1989-Q4 1991-Q2 1992-Q4 1994-Q2 1995-Q4 1997-Q2 1998 The reason for our focus on US dollar-denominated bank ‡ows stems from the dominant role played by the US dollar in the global banking system. Figure 3 plots the foreign currency assets and liabilities of banks globally, as measured by the BIS locational banking statistics.
Locational data are organized according to the residence principle, and so the US dollar series in Figure 3 show the US dollar-denominated assets and liabilities of banks outside the United
States. The Euro series show the corresponding Euro-denominated assets and liabilities of banks that are outside the Euro area, and so on.
What is clear from Figure 3 is that the US dollar is the dominant currency for international banking, and has been the currency behind the growth of gross capital ‡ows highlighted by Borio and Disyatat (2011) and Obstfeld (2012) . The US dollar asset series exceeded 10 trillion dollars in 2008Q1, brie ‡y exceeding the total assets of the US chartered commercial bank sector (see Shin (2012b) Table 7A) key indicator of the availability of US dollar funding for cross-border transactions, and we pay special attention to this variable in our empirical investigation. Although the borrowers have wide geographical spread, we see a synchronized boom in crossborder lending before the recent …nancial crisis.
The observed capital ‡ows re ‡ect the interaction of the supply and demand for wholesale funding between global and local banks. When local and global banks interact in the market for wholesale bank funding, the liabilities of local banks serve as the assets of the global banks, and the lending by global banks is the supply of wholesale funding, while the borrowing by local banks is its demand. The distinction between the demand and supply of wholesale funding harks back to Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996) , who distinguished the "push"and "pull"
factors that drive capital ‡ows into emerging economies. Nevertheless, to the extent that global "supply push"factors are important determinants of capital ‡ows that a¤ect all capital recipient countries, macroprudential policies that mitigate the procyclical response of an economy to such factors may have stabilization bene…ts. The fact that global factors a¤ect all countries also allows us to exploit the panel structure of the data and examine how the sensitivity of capital ‡ows into a particular country varies before and after the introduction of new policies by treating the other countries in the sample as a comparison group.
In our empirical investigation, we make use of two global factors. The …rst is the growth of the net intero¢ ce assets of foreign banks in the United States (the series shown in the right hand panel of Figure 5 ), re ‡ecting the activities of international banks that engage in the supply of wholesale bank funding. A rapid increase in the net intero¢ ce assets series re ‡ects an expansion of cross-border banking activities of global banks. We will see that the run-up in cross-border lending in Figure 4 closely mirrors the increase in wholesale funding raised by the global banks in Figure 5 In e¤ect, Figure The second set of global factors we employ in our empirical investigation are those associated with the VIX index of implied volatility of equity index options in the United States. There is well-documented evidence that banking sector leverage is closely associated with ‡uctuations in the VIX index (see, for instance, Shin (2010, 2012) ). Leverage of the banking sector -both global and local -are important determinants of cross-border claims. When leverage is high, an additional unit of bank capital will translate into a higher level of cross-border claims.
In addition, any increase in bank leverage will mean that existing bank capital will support higher amounts of lending. Therefore, since VIX is correlated with bank leverage, the theory predicts that both the level of the VIX, as well as the change in the VIX will show up as being determinants as capital ‡ows (see Bruno and Shin (2011) ). 
Case of Korea
The procyclicality of the banking sector and its use of cross-border funding is a useful lens through which to view Korea's experience. Korea was one of the countries hardest hit during During the period of rapid capital in ‡ows, the banking sector in Korea (including the foreign bank branches) also held dollar assets, but the counterparties were local borrowers, such as exporting companies who held long-term dollar assets arising from their export receivables.
Although the overall currency mismatch on the consolidated balance sheet consisting of the corporate and banking sectors would then cancel out, a maturity mismatch between long-term dollar claims and short-term dollar liabilities took its place. In e¤ect, the currency mismatch was replaced by a maturity mismatch which left the Korean …nancial system vulnerable to the global …nancial crisis in 2008 that followed in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
Chung, Park and Shin (2012) give more detailed discussion of the role of hedging by exporting companies as a contributory factor in the rapid growth of short-term foreign currency bank liabilities.
These lessons led to a concerted policy initiative on the part of Korean policy makers to mitigate some of the known vulnerabilities. The IMF Background Paper on macroprudential policies (IMF (2012)) provides information on the timing and rationale of the macroprudential policies in Korea. Beginning in June 2010, the authorities in Korea introduced a sequence of macroprudential measures aimed at building resilience against its well-known vulnerability to capital ‡ow reversals in the banking sector and the associated disruptions to domestic …nancial conditions. The policy initiative was widely reported in both the domestic and international press at the time, and the press reports are useful in dating the sequence of events.
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The …rst policy measure announced by the Korean authorities (in June 2010) was a leverage cap on the notional value of foreign exchange derivatives contracts (encompassing currency swaps and forwards) that banks could maintain (see IMF (2012, p. 50) ). For foreign bank branches, the leverage cap was set at 2.5 times their capital, while for domestic Korean banks, the cap was set at 50% of their capital. Foreign banks could in principle increase their positions by allocating greater capital to their branches in Korea, but the leverage cap lowers the return to capital for banks engaged in this segment of their business, thereby serving as a disincentive on expansion of derivatives positions.
The second component was the levy on the non-core liabilities of the banks (the "macroprudential levy"), applied to the foreign exchange-denominated liabilities of the banking sector.
The Korean non-core liabilities levy was relatively unfamiliar compared to the standard bank capital-related tools or standard capital control tools such as the unremunerated reserve requirements (URR). For this reason, the roll-out took more time. Although the policy was discussed from February of 2010 ) and press coverage trailed the introduction of the non-core levy from early in 2010, 5 the measure was announced formally in December 2010, after the conclusion of the G20 Seoul summit in November. The legislation was passed in April of 2011, and the levy began its operation in August 2011 (see IMF (2012)).
The levy consists of an annualized 20 basis point charge on the wholesale foreign exchange denominated liabilities of the banks of maturity up to 12 months. Lower rates are applied in a graduated manner to maturities of over one year.
The levy was designed so that the proceeds of the levy are paid into a special segregated account of the foreign exchange reserves, rather than going into the general revenue of the government. In this respect, the Korean levy was designed from the outset as a …nancial stability tool, rather than as a …scal measure. The outwardly similar bank levies introduced by France and the UK in 2010 had the proceeds being paid into general government revenue, and were designed as …scal measures to supplement government revenue. By targeting non-core liabilities only, the levy was also designed to address the procyclicality of the banking sector while leaving una¤ected (as far as possible) the intermediation of core funding from savers to borrowers. Figure 5 indicates the date of the introduction of the macroprudential policies by the dark grey bar at June 2010. We see some evidence from the chart that short-term bank liabilities continued to shrink, and was replaced with long-term liabilities, both in the form of long-term securities and long-term loans. However, just examining the series for Korea in isolation does not control for external conditions and other factors that a¤ect the banking landscape more broadly. For a proper assessment of the policies, we need to examine Korea's experience in comparison with other countries. This is our task in the rest of the paper.
For the purpose of our empirical investigation, the exact dating of the impact of the noncore liabilities levy is complicated by the long gestation period between initial discussions of its adoption and its …nal implementation. Some anticipation of the new measure will have a¤ected behavior before the formal introduction of the levy, but the quanti…cation of the anticipation e¤ect is di¢ cult, and is not attempted here. The announcement of the cap of foreign exchange derivatives in June 2010 serves as a useful threshold point, but we will conduct a number of tests to enable us to identify the break point in the time series.
The Korean measures should be seen in the context of the broader debate on macroprudential policies. Galati and Moessner (2012) survey the recent literature, and Claessens and Ghosh (2012) discuss evidence on the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policies for moderating credit growth in emerging economies. As a policy tool, the Korean non-core liabilities measure is distinctive in the way that it acts directly on cost of bank liabilities, unlike bank capital-related tools or direct restraints on credit growth, such as loan-to-value (LTV) or debt service-toincome (DTI) caps. Shin (2012a, section 4) discusses the advantages of such an approach and the broader tradeo¤s involved in alternative macroprudential policies. We do not pursue the policy design implications here, but our empirical results may be useful in more detailed and comprehensive studies of the tradeo¤s involved in macroprudential policy design.
3 Empirical Findings
Data Description
In conducting our assessment of the impact of Korea's macroprudential policies, our sample of countries includes all the developed countries, the "Big Five" countries in ASEAN (so as to provide the basis for a regional comparison for Korea) and a selection of emerging economies. Our measure of capital ‡ows is the quarterly growth in external claims of BIS reporting country banks, as given by the BIS locational statistics (Table 7A ). As explained above, the growth in the intero¢ ce assets of foreign banks in the United States (from the Federal Reserve, series H8 on commercial banks) and the VIX (the CBOE index of implied volatility in S&P 500 stock index option prices) are the two proxies re ‡ecting the cross-border activities and the leverage of global banks. In addition to the VIX in log level, we also include the quarterly log di¤erence of the VIX (denoted by VIX). The VIX level is a proxy for the leverage of the global banks, and hence the rate at which each unit of new equity is translated into lending. On the other hand, VIX is the proxy for the change in leverage, and hence the rate at which lending grows based on the existing level of equity (see Bruno and Shin (2011) for details).
We also include several control variables -both global and local -as possible determinants of capital ‡ows. We include the log real exchange rate (RER), where RER is computed as the log of nominal exchange rate*(US CPI/local CPI). The nominal exchange rate is in units of national currency per U.S. Dollar (from the IMF's IFS database). The quarterly growth in the global money supply ( Money stock) is calculated as the quarterly log di¤erence of the sum of the M2 stock in the US, Eurozone and Japan and M4 in the UK (from the IFS). GDP growth is the country percentage change in GDP from the previous year (from the WEO). Debt to GDP is the change in government gross debt to GDP (from WEO). All quarter variables (with the exception of VIX) are lagged by one quarter to mitigate endogeneity issues. The sample period spans from the …rst quarter of 1996 (the …rst date covered in Table 7A of the BIS locational data) to the latest data at the time of writing, which is the …rst quarter of 2012.
Empirical Speci…cation
Our empirical investigation is based on various modi…cations of the following benchmark panel regressions similar to Bruno and Shin (2011) :
Here, L c;t is banking sector capital in ‡ow into country c in period t, as given by the quarterly log di¤erence in the external claims of BIS reporting country banks on country c between quarters t and t 1; VIX t 1 is the log of end-quarter VIX index lagged by one quarter; Intero¢ ce t 1 is the growth in intero¢ ce assets of foreign banks in the US from the quarter before given by the percentage growth and lagged by one quarter. The control set includes all the variables listed in Section 3.1. Regressions include country …xed e¤ects, year dummies and clustered standard errors at the country level. Year dummies still leave scope for quarterly variations in our global variables, and they turn out to be highly signi…cant, as seen below.
Our empirical approach is to include in the benchmark panel speci…cation a dummy variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for the period from June 2010 ("Post 2010") and a dummy variable equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for Korea ("Korea"). We then interact each dummy variable with each global factors. Our focus is on the triple interaction terms given by Global factor Korea Post 2010 (2) which give the incremental sensitivity of capital ‡ows to Korea to the global factor from June 2010. In addition, we also examine the coe¢ cients of the pairwise interaction terms:
Global factor Korea, Global factor Post 2010
By comparing the coe¢ cients between the triple interaction term (2) and the two double interaction terms (3), we can ascertain whether the change in sensitivity to the global factor in Korea after 2010 is due to a shift over time, or whether the change in sensitivity is Korea-speci…c. We also construct similar interaction terms and regressions for all the other variables included in the benchmark estimation. 
Empirical Findings
Sensitivity to Global Financial Activities
The coe¢ cient 1 in Table 2 Table 2 , column (3) gives the i estimates for the interaction terms with the Intero¢ ce variable, and column (5) gives the and coe¢ cients for the interaction terms involving the VIX and VIX global factors.
Column (1) reports results from the benchmark regression (1). The VIX index in levels and log di¤erences as well as the Intero¢ ce variables are highly signi…cant and of the predicted sign as also shown in Bruno and Shin (2011) . The signi…cance of Intero¢ ce indicates that the activities of global banks (mainly European banks, as shown in Shin (2012b) ) are correlated with the capital in ‡ows into our sample of countries. In this context, ‡uctuations in the VIX index (both in the level as well as its quarterly log di¤erence) are associated with shifts in the leverage of the banking sector and hence the capital ‡ows through the banking sector. Columns (4) and (5) show results of our augmented speci…cation with the dummy Korea and the dummy Post 2010 and their interactions with VIX and VIX. Column (5) shows that Korea has had greater sensitivity to the other global factors, VIX and VIX, as seen from the fact that 3 < 0 and 3 < 0 (recall that VIX and leverage are inversely related, and so more negative coe¢ cients indicate greater sensitivity). Nevertheless, 4 is not signi…cant and 4 < 0 indicating that Korea hasn't become more sensitive to the VIX and actually has become less sensitive to VIX and VIX after June 2010.
We also conduct a full set of F -tests on the incremental sensitivity and total e¤ect over 2 + 4 = 0 tests the null hypothesis that there has been no change in the sensitivity of Korea to Intero¢ ce before and after 2010 (comparing across rows in (4)).
3 + 4 = 0 tests the null hypothesis that there is no di¤erence between Korea and the rest of the sample to Intero¢ ce after 2010 (comparing across columns in (4)).
We perform a similar set of tests also for VIX (coe¢ cients ) and VIX (coe¢ cients ): Table   3 reports the full set of F -tests for Intero¢ ce, VIX and VIX each corresponding to the Table 3 . F tests for coe¢ cient restrictions in Table 2 . This table presents F tests for coe¢ cient restrictions in Table 2 . The column labels refer to Table 2 While non-Korean countries became more sensitive to changes in Intero¢ ce after June 2010, Table 3 column (3) shows that Korea became less sensitive ( 2 + 4 negative and signi…cant).
Moreover, before 2010 the impact of Intero¢ ce was higher for Korea than for the rest of the world ( 3 positive and signi…cant) and became lower after 2010 ( 3 + 4 negative and signi…cant).
The total resulting e¤ect for Korea after 2010 is that global banks activities did no longer have a signi…cant impact on capital ‡ows for Korea ( 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 0).
A similar trend occurs for the change in VIX. Korea became less sensitive to changes in the VIX after 2010 ( 2 + 4 positive and signi…cant ), whereas non-Korean countries became more sensitive ( 2 negative and signi…cant). The total e¤ect for Korea after 2010 is that changes in VIX did no longer have a signi…cant impact on capital ‡ows for Korea ( 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 0). However, after June 2010 Korea continued remaining more sensitive to the level of the VIX than the rest of the world ( 3 + 4 negative and signi…cant). Taken together, the weight of the evidence points to a structural shift in Korea's sensitivity to global banking ‡ows, with the e¤ect being stronger through the lens of the funding activities (intero¢ ce assets) of global banks.
Sensitivity to Additional Factors
So far we have examined the impact of global banking activities and how they in ‡uence capital ‡ows. We now turn to the additional explanatory variables listed in Table 2 . In particular, we see that RER coe¢ cient is negative and highly signi…cant. Hence, when the local currency appreciates against the dollar from quarter t 1 to quarter t, there is an acceleration of capital ‡ows into that country from quarter t to quarter t + 1. This feature is a natural consequence of a setting where borrowers from the local banks have a currency mismatch, as shown in Bruno and Shin (2011) . When the local currency appreciates, the borrowers'balance sheets become stronger, thereby reducing the credit risk on the bank's loan book, which in turn increases the capacity of local banks to lend. The increased lending is …nanced with capital in ‡ows.
Capital ‡ows are also increasing in the growth of the global M2 money stock worldwide, which re ‡ects the greater demand for funding by banks, as well as the increased capital ‡ows through non-…nancial …rms, who hold the proceeds of any increased funding operation by holding cash in the banks.
In Table 4 , we conduct an analysis of the structural change in the capital ‡ows with respect to the RER, M2, GDP growth and change in DEBT/GDP similar to that in Table 2 . We follow the analogous method of de…ning triple interactions between each local factor with the time dummy that takes the value 1 if the date is June 2010 or later, and with the country dummy that takes the value of 1 for Korea and zero otherwise. The F -tests for structural change with respect to each of the four variables are presented in Table 5 , where (1), (2), (3), (4) In Korea, capital ‡ows increases became less dependent on increases in global money stock or GDP growth and on decreases in government debt. In particular, Korea was more sensitive to global money (Money stock) before June 2010 and becomes less sensitive after June 2010, whereas the e¤ect for the rest of the world is unchanged. An increase in GDP was a signi…cant local pull factor before June 2010 for all countries and even more for Korea, but it is actually reversed after June 2010. Symmetrically, an increase in Debt to GDP was a signi…cant push Table 5 . F tests for coe¢ cient restrictions in Table 4 . This table presents F tests for coe¢ cient restrictions in Table 4 for the local variables RER, M2, GDP growth and Debt/GDP. The null (2) + (4) = 0 corresponds to the statement that the sensitivity of capital ‡ows into Korea with respect to the local variable does not change after June 2010. The null hypothesis (3) + (4) = 0 is the statement that there is no di¤erence in sensitivity to that variable between Korea and the other countries after June 2010. p-values are reported for each null hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3) 
Alternative Test of the Sensitivity to Capital Flows
An alternative approach to testing for the moderation of sensitivity of capital ‡ows is to investigate the reduced co-movement between capital ‡ows into Korea and the aggregate capital ‡ows to all countries. We implement this test with the following two step procedure.
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In the …rst step, we compute the variable Beta (i; t) by regressing the capital ‡ows into country i on the aggregate capital ‡ows to all countries on a rolling eight quarter window ft 7; ; t 1; tg. The estimation window of Beta (i; t) starts in 1999 and it excludes the period of the Asian crisis 1997 and 1998 to mitigate endogeneity problems.
In the second step, we use Beta (i; t) as the dependent variable in an OLS regression. The right hand side variables are the Korea dummy, the Post 2010 dummy and the interaction term Korea*Post 2010. Other explanatory variables are VIX, VIX. We include the full set of year Table 6 . Covariation between individual country and aggregate capital ‡ows. This table reports results of the two step procedure where …rst, we compute Beta (i; t) by regressing capital ‡ows to country i on aggregate capital ‡ows over a rolling eight quarter window ft 7; ; t 1; tg. In the second step, Beta (i; t) is the dependent variable in an OLS regression with global explanatory variables and dummies for Korea and Post-2010 period and their interaction. A full set of time and country dummies are also included. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parantheses. and country dummies, and compute robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
The results are presented in Table 6 . The coe¢ cient 1 of the Korea dummy indicates the additional sensitivity of capital ‡ows into Korea relative to the other countries in the sample before June 2010. We see from Table 6 that the coe¢ cient 1 is positive and signi…cant.
However, we see from the negative coe¢ cient 2 on the interaction dummy Korea*Post 2010 that the sensitivity of capital ‡ows into Korea dropped sharply after June 2010.
Even more dramatically, we have 1 + 2 < 0, so that the sensitivity of Korea ‡ips from being more sensitive relative to the whole sample to less sensitive. The null hypothesis 1 + 2 = 0 can be rejected with a p-value of 0.0011. This …nding casts the macroprudential policies into an even more favorable light.
Overall, the conjunction of the …ndings from the analysis of sensitivity to the global variables and the local variables point to the moderation of capital ‡ows. We interpret our …ndings as providing some preliminary evidence that the newly introduced macroprudential policies in Korea have seen some initial success in moderating the sensitivity of capital ‡ows to external factors.
5 Robustness Checks
Evidence from Other Countries in Asia.
Evidence of change in incremental sensitivity cannot be taken as conclusive proof of the e¤ect of the macroprudential policy, since the experiment is simply to look before and after June 2010. However, we complement our incremental sensitivity analysis for Korea by comparing the results for Korea with those of other countries in the region, as well as examining evidence for any structural breaks in the way that our variables of interest impact capital ‡ows, so that we may place the results on Korea into context. Through this exercise, we may ascertain the extent to which the results for Korea are shared by other Asian countries, and hence give clues on any regional variations in our sample.
We therefore run panel regressions analogous to those in Table 2 We focus on the Intero¢ ce variable as the main global factor capturing the funding ac- Table 7A ). Expanatory variables include the global and local variables in Table 2 Table 8 . F tests for coe¢ cient restrictions in Table 7 . This table presents F tests for coe¢ cient restrictions in Table 7 for the interaction of Intero¢ ce with the time dummy for the period from June 2010 and with the dummy for the particular country examined. We examine Australia (AUS), Indonesia (IDN), Malaysia (MYS), Philippines (PHL), Thailand (THA) and Vietnam (VNM). The null hypothesis (2) + (4) = 0 corresponds to the statement that the sensitivity of capital ‡ows to that country with respect to Intero¢ ce does not change after June 2010. The null hypothesis (3) + (4) = 0 corresponds to the statement that there is no di¤erence in sensitivity to Intero¢ ce between the country and the other countries in the 48 country sample after June 2010. p-values are reported for each null hypothesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) tivities of global banks, and follow the empirical procedure reported in Table 2 using the country dummy and Post 2010 dummy, as well as the interaction between the two. The results are reported in Table 7 . For economy of presentation, we report only the key interaction coe¢ cients. For each country, we report the coe¢ cient on Intero¢ ce*Country and on Intero¢ ce*Country*Post 2010. We assign the same numbering to the interaction dummies coe¢ cients as we did for Table 2 and Table 3 .
The evidence on Intero¢ ce is striking. In contrast to Korea, all countries in Table 7 except Indonesia show positive coe¢ cients on the triple interaction term Intero¢ ce*Country*Post 2010, meaning that Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam became more sensitive to ‡uctuations in global bank funding conditions after June 2010. Even in the case of Indonesia, the coe¢ cient is insigni…cant, rather than being negatively signi…cant as in Korea.
We conduct F -tests for structural change, and the results are reported in Table 8 . The numbering convention for the null hypotheses remains the same as before. The null hypothesis (2) + (4) = 0 corresponds to the statement that the sensitivity of the country to Intero¢ ce does not change after June 2010. We see that this hypothesis is resoundingly rejected for all four local variables. However, unlike in the case of Korea, the null hypothesis (2) + (4) = 0 is rejected for the opposite reason from Korea. In these other Asian countries, capital ‡ows became more sensitive to global factors after 2010, rather than less sensitive.
The null hypothesis (3) + (4) = 0 corresponds to the statement that there is no di¤erence between the country and the other countries in the full sample after June 2010. We see that the null hypothesis (3) + (4) = 0 is strongly rejected for Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam. It is only for Indonesia that the null (3) + (4) = 0 cannot be rejected.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that there has been a markedly lower sensitivity to global funding on capital ‡ows in Korea, even when all other comparable countries in the region saw the opposite e¤ect -toward an increased sensitivity to global factors in the determination of capital ‡ows. Our results are suggestive that the introduction of macroprudential policies in Korea served to mitigate the notorious sensitivity of Korea to external …nancial conditions.
Dating the Structural Change
So far, we have relied on the a priori knowledge of policy announcements and press reports to choose the threshold date for the macroprudential policies to June 2010. We will now adopt a more agnostic procedure in dating the structural break by examining at each date the evidence for structural break at that date, and then compiling the evidence for the whole period after the start of 2010.
Speci…cally, we run the following panel speci…cation. 7 Starting from the benchmark panel regression, we introduce the interaction dummies:
Intero¢ ce*Korea*Pre, Intero¢ ce*Pre,
where Pre is the dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the date is before the end of 2009, and zero otherwise. We also introduce the interaction dummies Intero¢ ce*Korea*Q(n), Intero¢ ce*Q(n), Table 2 , and interaction dummies Intero¢ ce*Korea*Pre and Intero¢ ce*Pre, where Pre = 1 up to the end of 2009, and zero afterwards. Also included are Intero¢ ce*Korea*Q(n) and Intero¢ ce*Q(n) where Q (n) = 1 in the nth quarter from 2010:Q1 and zero otherwise. We run separate panel regressions for each n and report their coe¢ cients below. for quarter n starting from the …rst quarter of 2010, and where Q (n) is the dummy that takes the value 1 in quarter n and zero otherwise. We then run the benchmark panel regression with the inclusion of the two triple interaction terms in (5) and (6), and report their coe¢ cients in Table 9 .
By examining the coe¢ cients and the standard errors for these variables for each quarter beginning in 2010, the rationale of this procedure is to obtain a more precise dating of the structural break for Korea, and to examine how uniform the lower sensitivity to global factors are over the post-2010 period.
From the t-statistics reported in Table 9 , we see that a 0 > 0, and so the sensitivity of Korea to Intero¢ ce prior to 2010 was strongly positive. However, for the coe¢ cients a 1 to a 9 , we see that all but one is negative and signi…cant. The only exception is March 2011. We observe the reverse pattern for the t coe¢ cients, which are all positive and signi…cant with the excpetion of 4 :
From this evidence, we can conclude that Korea became less sensitive compared to global factors compared to the other countries in our sample of 48 countries. The evidence is consistently present throughout the period after 2009. These results give some cause for reassurance that our earlier results that rely on the partitioning of the sample period into "before and after" subsamples does not rely on outlier observations to mask the overall e¤ect. The evidence points to the impact of the macroprudential policies falling uniformly over the whole period from 2010.
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
Given the accumulated evidence assembled in this paper, the following conclusions seem justi…ed concerning the impact of Korea's macroprudential policies.
First, there is evidence from a variety of approaches that the sensitivity of capital ‡ows to global factors reduced substantially in the case of Korea from 2010. We have seen this both through the signs of the interaction dummies, through F -tests of structural breaks, as well as the co-movement measurements using our Beta(i; t) variables.
Remarkably, the dampening of sensitivity in Korea sits side-by-side with evidence that Korea's experience is di¤erent from group of comparable Asian countries. For these Asian countries, they saw an increase in the sensitivity of their capital ‡ows to global factors after 2010.
Since the original …ndings for Korea were relative to the global comparison group, the increased sensitivity of Australia, and other Asian comparison countries is representative of global trends as a whole. Given such a backdrop, the conspicuous drop in the sensitivity of capital ‡ows into Korea is all the more notable.
Finally, we have seen that the lower sensitivity of Korea's capital ‡ows to global factors after 2010 is an e¤ect that is uniformly present throughout the post-2010 period, rather than relying on one or two outliers to get the overall sign.
The results in our paper reiterate a number of broader lessons. The evidence in our paper suggests that the driving force behind banking sector capital ‡ows is the leverage cycle of the banking sector, through the interaction of the supply and demand of wholesale bank funding.
Our …ndings reinforce the argument in Borio and Disyatat (2011 ), Obstfeld (2012a , 2012b and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) on the importance of gross capital ‡ows between countries in determining …nancial conditions, especially the gross ‡ows intermediated by the banking sector.
Bank capital ‡ows have also been pivotal in the European …nancial crisis. The credit boom in countries such as Ireland and Spain were …nanced primarily by capital ‡ows through the banking sector (see Allen, Beck, Carletti, Lane, Schoenmaker and Wagner (2011) and Lane and Pels (2011) ). Therefore, the mechanisms outlined here on the link between capital ‡ows and leverage are relevant in understanding the European crisis, also.
Our …ndings highlight the role of …nancial intermediaries in driving ‡uctuations in risk premiums and …nancial conditions, especially in connection with the growing use of wholesale bank funding.
The procyclicality of banking sector capital ‡ows poses challenges in setting policy and regulatory responses. The cross-border spillovers associated with banking sector ‡ows highlights the importance of international coordination in banking regulation and in monetary policy, but such coordination is not straightforward to design or implement, even when the interests of the relevant countries are congruent. Moreover, even when coordination is globally optimal, it still may generate tensions with national governance.
In the absence of e¤ective international coordination, a second best approach (that takes the spillovers as given) would be appropriate in designing a framework to mitigate the risks of cross-border ‡ows at the national level. The recent report by the Committee on International Economic Policy Reform (CIEPR (2012)) describes the considerations that are relevant in setting policy on capital ‡ows in a second best world. The macroprudential policies introduced in Korea in 2010 can be viewed in this context. The Korean measures should also be seen in the context of the broader debate on the design of policies toward …nancial stability. Although the term "macroprudential"is now commonly encountered in the policy world, empirical studies on their e¤ectiveness have been comparatively less common. In this context, our empirical results may be a useful input in more detailed studies of the tradeo¤s involved in macroprudential policy design.
